

were ready. It was therefore decided by the War Cabinet to deliver an ultimatum to him demanding the immediate withdrawal of the whole *An ultimatum* of the Greek Army in Thessaly to the *Constantine* Peloponnesus. He was given 24 hours in which to make up his mind. Had he refused he would have been immediately attacked by land and sea. The threat answered the purpose. Constantine promised compliance. At first there was a suspicious tardiness in his redemption of the promise. But a blockade by the British Fleet convinced him that his only security lay in speeding up the retirement of his Thessaly force. A portion of our anxiety about the situation at Salonika was thus relieved. It was, however, still felt that the strength of our forces there was insufficient and the positions they held were too weak to enable them to resist a serious attack from the victorious forces of the Central Powers in the Balkan Peninsula. Consequently we proposed that the Italians, who had a shorter sea route, should send a couple of divisions across the Adriatic to Santi Quaranta, and that they should immediately take in hand the improvement of the communications between that port and Monastir. I record our negotiations on this issue in my account of the Rome Conference. If the Italians could not see their way to spare troops

for the purpose, we suggested that
arrangements
should be made, in the event of a
formidable attack
by the enemy, for a retirement of the
Allied Armies
to prepared entrenchments in front of
Salonika.
Meanwhile we took steps to send drafts
to restore
to full strength units which had been
thinned by
sporadic fighting and by disease. The
French con-